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THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
SOUTHERN DIVISION
PETER D. KINDER,
MISSOURI LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR,
DALE MORRIS,
SAMANTHA HILL,
JULIE KEATHLEY,
individually and as parent and guardian for
MASON KEATHLEY, her minor son.
Plaintiffs,
v.
TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
SECRETARY OF TREASURY,
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS,
SECRETARY OF HHS,
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
ATTORNEY GENERAL
HILDA L. SOLIS,
SECRETARY OF LABOR,
Defendants.
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)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Cause No: _____________________

COMPLAINT

SUMMARY OF THIS CASE
This case is brought by Missouri Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder (in his individual
capacity as a Missouri citizen, taxpayer, and voter and also in his statutory capacity as Lieutenant
Governor charged with being the advocate for Missouri’s elderly) and by a number of individual
Missouri citizens whose federal and state constitutional rights have been violated by certain
provisions of the recently-adopted federal healthcare legislation. This case addresses those
specific provisions of the newly-enacted federal health-care law that, as applied to these Missouri
citizens, violate the rights they are guaranteed under the United States and Missouri
Constitutions.
Plaintiffs support the laudable goal of assuring that every Missourian—and American—
enjoy access to quality health care. Plaintiffs bring this case, however, because it is necessary
that the legislation seeking this objective is consistent with their rights under the United States
and Missouri Constitutions. The essence of this case is that certain provisions of the new federal
health-care law—the Patient Protection And Affordable Care Act and its sister statute, the Health
Care and Education Reconciliation Act (referred to herein, collectively, as “PPACA”)—not only
deny these Missouri citizens the right to maintain their current health insurance (or otherwise
procure appropriate health care for their situation), but they do so through unconstitutional
means.
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I.

THE MISSOURI CITIZENS BRINGING THIS CASE.
A.

Missouri Lieutenant Governor Peter Kinder, a Missouri constitutional
officer charged by statute to advocate for Missouri’s elderly.
1.

Peter D. Kinder is a Missouri citizen, taxpayer, and resident of Cape
Girardeau County, Missouri.

2.

On November 2, 2004, Missouri voters elected Peter Kinder to be their
Lieutenant Governor.

Missouri voters reelected Lieutenant Governor

Kinder on November 4, 2008.
3.

Lieutenant Governor Kinder’s salary and benefits, like those of all
Missouri’s Constitutional officers, are determined by the Missouri
Legislature and paid for by Missouri taxpayers.

4.

Lieutenant Governor Kinder is provided health insurance by the State of
Missouri through a health-care plan common to other Missouri state
employees called the Missouri Consolidated Health Care Plan. The health
care services covered under this plan and the terms of the plan are
determined by the State of Missouri in its sovereign capacity.

5.

Lieutenant Governor Kinder pays for his share of the plan through a
payroll deduction from his salary as an elected state official.

6.

The Missouri Constitution provides “[The Lieutenant Governor] shall
have the same qualifications as the governor and shall be ex officio
president of the senate. In committee of the whole he may debate all
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questions, and shall cast the deciding vote on equal division in the senate
and on joint vote of both houses.” MO. CONST., art. IV, § 10.
7.

In addition to his enumerated duties as they are set forth in the Missouri
Constitution, Lieutenant Governor Kinder has been empowered to
advocate for Missouri senior citizens and those in long-term care facilities
as the head of the Office of Office of Advocacy and Assistance for Senior
Citizens. See MO. REV. STAT. § 660.620 (2009).

B.

Dale Morris – an elderly Missouri citizen who desires the option to keep her
Medicare Advantage coverage.
8.

Dale Morris is a citizen of the State of Missouri and is a Missouri
taxpayer.

9.

Dale Morris lives in St. Louis County, Missouri.

10.

Dale Morris is more than 65 years old and has paid into the Medicare
system for at least 10 years. Under Sections 1818 (Part A), 1836 (Part B),
1851 (Part C), and 1860D-1 (Part D) of Title XVIII of the Social Security
Act, she is eligible to receive health insurance benefits under Medicare.

11.

Dale Morris suffers, or has suffered, from several serious medical
conditions including two heart attacks, colon cancer, and congestive heart
failure.

As a result of these medical conditions, she has received

quadruple bypass heart surgery and requires consistent medical care.
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12.

Under Section 1851 of Title XVIII of the Social Security Act, Dale Morris
is eligible to purchase supplemental Medicare coverage—called “Part C”
or “Medicare Advantage.”

13.

Medicare Advantage provides Dale Morris coverage for medical care and
medical expenses not otherwise covered by traditional Medicare (Parts A
and B), including prescription-drug coverage, vision, hearing, and
preventive care. Medicare Advantage also allows Dale Morris to receive
medical care from physicians and other providers who do not accept just
Medicare Part A and B.

C.

Samantha Hill, a young Missourian who desires the ability to purchase
major medical coverage but does not want to be forced to purchase insurance
coverage she does not need or desire.
14.

Samantha Hill is a 21 year-old Missouri citizen and taxpayer living in
Holden, Johnson County, Missouri.

15.

Samantha Hill has (and desires to retain) the ability to purchase and
participate in health-care plans offering “major medical” insurance
coverage, defined as coverage with a high deductible.

16.

Under these “major medical” plans, Samantha Hill pays for preventive
care and routine medical expenses, but, should she become seriously ill,
private insurance coverage will pay any “major-medical” or “catastrophic”
medical expenses in excess of the deductible.
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17.

An individual “major medical” plan (as such is currently available) is less
expensive because it does not cover treatments that Samantha Hill does
not need. Rather than pay premiums for routine health care and treatments
she does not want or need, Samantha Hill desires to personally pay for any
routine medical expenses that would not be covered by a major medical
health-insurance plan, with the money she saves by not having to purchase
the more expensive federally-mandated health care coverage used to pay
her other bills and living expenses.

18.

Samantha Hill lives a healthy lifestyle, does not smoke tobacco, and does
not abuse drugs or alcohol. She maintains a healthy regime of exercise
and physical fitness. She is unmarried, is not pregnant, and does not have
any children.

19.

Samantha Hill has no need or desire to purchase or pay for insurance
coverage covering infant and child care and, inter alia, lactation
consulting and over 200 other preventative services.

D.

Julie Keathley, on her own behalf and as parent and guardian of her son,
Mason Keathley, an eight year old child with autism.
20.

Julie Keathley is a Missouri citizen and a resident of Stoddard County.

21.

Mason Keathley is the son of Julie Keathley and her late husband Michael.

22.

Mason Keathley is eight years old and suffers from autism.
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23.

On March 18, 2010, Senate Bill 618 passed the Missouri Senate. On
March 30, 2010, the bill was referred to the House Special Standing
Committee on Health Insurance. The bill subsequently passed and will
become law effective August 28, 2010.

24.

Senate Bill 618 requires private medical insurance companies selling
health care insurance in Missouri to provide coverage for autism-related
behavioral therapy.

25.

Mason Keathley will benefit from this autism coverage requirement.
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II.

THE DEFENDANTS.
A.

Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.
26.

Eric H. Holder, Jr. is the Attorney General of the United States. As the
Attorney General, he is the head of the Department of Justice and the chief
law enforcement officer of the federal government. Accordingly, he is
charged with enforcing the civil and criminal laws of the United States,
including PPACA. Defendant Holder is sued in his official capacity.

B.

Secretary of HHS Kathleen Sebelius
27.

Kathleen Sebelius is Secretary of the United States Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) and is named in her official capacity.

28.

HHS is an agency of the United States government and is responsible for
the administration and enforcement of certain provisions of PPACA.

C.

Secretary of Treasury Timothy F. Geithner
29.

Timothy F. Geithner is Secretary of the United States Department of the
Treasury and is named in his official capacity.

30.

The Treasury Department is an agency of the United Statesgovernment
and is responsible for administration and enforcement of certain
provisions of PPACA, including those provisions related to the Internal
Revenue Service.
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D.

Secretary of Labor Hilda L. Solis
31.

Hilda L. Solis is Secretary of the United States Department of Labor
(DOL) and is named in her official capacity.

32.

The Department of Labor is an agency of the United States government
and is responsible for the administration and enforcement of certain
provisions of PPACA.

III.

THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT OF 2009”
AND HOW IT CAME TO BE LAW.
33.

On Christmas Eve, the United States Senate passed H.R. 3590, the
PPACA. Sixty Senators cast a vote in favor of H.R 3590, 39 Senators
voted against H.R. 3590.

34.

H.R. 3590 was referred to the United States House of Representatives.

35.

On Easter Week, March 21, 2010, the United States House of
Representatives passed H.R. 3590 by a vote of 219 in favor and 212
opposed. No Republican member of Congress voted in favor of H.R.
3590, and 34 Democrat Members of Congress joined them in voting
against the bill.

36.

On March 23, 2010, President Obama signed H.R. 3590.

37.

On March 21, 2010, the United States House of Representatives adopted
H.R. 4872, the HCERA, in a parliamentary process called budget
reconciliation. HCERA contained revisions and additional corrections to
9

H.R. 3590. The House passed this HCERA Reconciliation Bill with a
vote of 220 in favor and 211 opposed. No Republican member of
Congress voted in favor of H.R. 3590 and 33 Democrat Members of
Congress joined them in voting against the bill.
38.

The United States Senate, on March 25, 2010 passed an amended
Reconciliation Bill by a vote of 56 in favor and 43 against, with 3
Democrat Senators voting against the measure.

39.

H.R. 4872, as amended, was referred back to the House of
Representatives.

40.

On March 25, 2010 the House of Representatives passed the
Reconciliation Bill, as amended by a vote of 220 in favor and 207 against,
with 32 Democrats voting against the measure.

41.

On March 30, 2010, President Obama signed the Reconciliation Bill.

42.

The Government Printing Office has not yet printed a single reconciled
document that contains the integrated provisions of the separate measures
that constitute the Health Care Bill. The final PPACA is composed of
Titles One through Nine of the original Senate Bill and Title 10 of the
Senate Amendments to Titles One through Nine, and these provisions are
overlaid with the revisions in the Reconciliation Bill.
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43.

In March 2010, Speaker of the United States House Of Representatives
Nancy Pelosi, said “[w]e have to pass the bill so that you can find out what
is in it.”1

IV.

JURISDICTION
44.

This action arises under the Constitution and laws of the United States.
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

45.

This action also involves the United States as a defendant. Jurisdiction is
thus proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a).

46.

Venue is proper as this is the district in which plaintiffs reside. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(e).

1

Press Release, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Remarks at the 2010 Legislative Conference for
National
Association
of
Counties
(Mar.
9,
2010)
(available
at
http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=1576).
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COUNT ONE
PPACA Is Unconstitutional Because
It Commandeers Missouri State Employees And
Compels Them To Enforce A Federal Health Care Scheme In
Contravention Of Missouri’s Sovereignty.
(Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
47.

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution confers upon
Congress discrete, enumerated, and limited powers.

48.

The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution states, “The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.”

49.

In FEDERALIST 45, James Madison wrote “[t]he powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government, are few and defined.
Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
indefinite.”

50.

In FEDERALIST 46, Madison further explained that “[t]he federal and State
governments are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
constituted with different powers and designed for different purposes.”
The powers of the State governments, Madison clarified, “extend to all the
objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives,
liberties, and properties of the people, and the internal order,
improvement, and prosperity of the State.”
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51.

In FEDERALIST 14, Madison confirmed that in distinguishing the separate
powers of these two levels of government, “the general government is not
to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its
jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the
members of the republic, but which are not to be attained by the separate
provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their
care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will
retain their due authority and activity.”

52.

And in FEDERALIST 39, Madison wrote, “the local or municipal authorities
form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject
within their respective spheres to the general authority, than the general
authority is subject to them, within its own sphere.”

53.

The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized and affirmed
the fundamental principle that the federal government and the states are
dual and independent sovereigns.

“As every schoolchild learns, our

Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty between the States
and the Federal Government.” GREGORY V. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452, 457
(1991); see also PRINTZ V. UNITED STATES, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); LANE
COUNTY V. STATE OF OREGON, 74 U.S. 71, 76-78 (1868).
54.

Because state governments are sovereign, state government officials may
not be compelled to act under federal authority. The Supreme Court has
emphasized that “there are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every
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state government which may not be impaired by Congress, not because
Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach
the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner.”

NAT’L LEAGUE

OF

CITIES V. USERY, 426 U.S.

833, 845 (1976) (overruled on other grounds by GARCIA V. SAN ANTONIO
METRO. TRANSIT AUTH., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); see also U.S. TERM LIMITS,
INC. V. THORNTON 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring);
UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549, 576-577 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring); NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES, 505 U.S. 144, 161-166 (1992).
55.

This separation of federal and state influence—i.e., federalism—is, in
tandem with the separation of powers, a bulwark of the Constitution’s
protections of individual liberty. “Just as the separation and independence
of the coordinate branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the
accumulation of excessive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of
power between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk
of tyranny and abuse from either front.” GREGORY, 501 U.S. at 458.

56.

The separation of federal and state government is inviolate, even where
State officials consent to its violation. NEW YORK, 505 U.S. at 181 (“[T]he
Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments for
the protection of individuals. State sovereignty is not just an end in itself:
Rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the
diffusion of sovereign power.”).
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57.

Nor can the federal government exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to run roughshod over the sovereignty of state governments and
duly-elected state officials.

“When a ‘La[w] . . . for carrying into

Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of state
sovereignty reflected in the various constitutional provisions . . . it is not a
‘La[w] . . . proper for carrying into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and
is thus, in the words of The Federalist, ‘merely [an] ac[t] of usurpation’
which ‘deserve[s] to be treated as such.’” PRINTZ, 521 U.S. at 923-24
(emph. orig.) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 33 (Alexander Hamilton)).
58.

The Constitution forbids the balancing of federal against state interests in
the application of this principle. To the extent the federal government
encroaches on upon the sovereignty of state government—for whatever
purpose—such act is offensive to Constitutional norms, and null and void.
“It is the very principle of separate state sovereignty that such a law
offends, and no comparative assessment of the various interests can
overcome that fundamental defect.” PRINTZ, 521 U.S. at 932 (emphasis in
original); cf. BOWSHER V. SYNAR, 478 U. S. 714, 736 (1986) (declining to
subject principle of separation of powers to a balancing test); INS V.
CHADHA, 462 U.S. 919, 944-946 (1983) (same).

59.

When a federal statute—or any provision thereto—violates these
fundamental constitutional principles, it is appropriate for this Court to
hold those provisions unconstitutional and strike down all of the statute, or
those portions that give rise to the violation. “Much of the Constitution is
15

concerned with setting forth the form of our government, and the courts
have traditionally invalidated measures deviating from that form. The
result may appear ‘formalistic’ in a given case to partisans of the measure
at issue, because such measures are typically the product of the era’s
perceived necessity. But the Constitution protects us from our own best
intentions: It divides power among sovereigns and among branches of
government precisely so that we may resist the temptation to concentrate
power in one location as an expedient solution to the crisis of the day.”
NEW YORK, 505 U.S. at 187.
60.

Instead of following this constitutional imperative, the PPACA compels
duly-elected Missouri officials to act under the direction of the federal
government to implement a federal health-care scheme against their will
and in contravention of their sovereign powers.

61.

It is clear that the “Federal Government may not compel the States to
enact or administer a federal regulatory program.” PRINTZ, 521 U.S. at
933 (quoting NEW YORK, 505 U.S. at 188); see also FERC V. MISSISSIPPI,
456 U.S. 742, 775 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).

62.

It follows that because the federal and state governments are sovereign
within their own realms, neither can impose a direct tax on the either
because such a tax is inimical to the sovereign power. The sovereign may
tax, but is not taxed.

As Justice Frankfurter has recognized, it is a

fundamental principle of Constitutional federalism that “[s]ince two
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governments have authority within the same territory, neither through its
power to tax can be allowed to cripple the operations of the other.
Therefore, state and federal governments must avoid exactions that
discriminate against each other or obviously interfere with one another’s
operations.” GRAVES V. NEW YORK, 306 U.S. 466, 488 (1939) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring),
B.

How PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
63.

Contravening Missouri’s sovereignty, PPACA commandeers Missouri’s
duly-elected state officials and compels them to enforce a federal
regulatory health-care scheme.

64.

PPACA requires state officials to take certain actions in furtherance of the
federal scheme. Section 1341 of PPACA, for example, requires states,
including the State of Missouri, to implement and maintain a
“reinsurance” program for the individual and small group market private
insurance plans that experience a higher level of claims. Likewise,
Section 1513 requires states, including the State of Missouri, to provide
what the federal government defines as a “qualified health benefit plan” or
face a substantial financial penalty payable to the Department of the
Treasury. These schemes cannot take effect without the mandated
cooperation of Missouri state officials.

65.

Lieutenant Governor Kinder, as a duly-elected constitutional officer of the
State of Missouri, and the Plaintiffs as citizens of Missouri and Missouri
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taxpayers, enjoy the protections afforded them by the United States and
Missouri Constitutions, including the right to be free from unwarranted
federal intrusion and interference.

Federal coercion of state officials

betrays these protections.
66.

Because PPACA violates the principles of dual sovereignty and federalism
by co-opting state officials to adopt federal law, this Court must invalidate
these provisions of PPACA and enjoin the federal government from any
further attempt to infringe on the sovereign powers of elected Missouri
officials.
COUNT TWO

PPACA Is Unconstitutional Because It Mandates The Compensation
Missouri Must Provide Its Constitutional Officers.
(Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
67.

This Count is premised upon constitutional principles set forth previously.
Therefore, we do not repeat, but incorporate, those points noted in Count
One.

68.

Another principle flowing from the constitutional principles set forth is
that the federal government may not mandate the terms of compensation a
state may pay its elected constitutional officers.

69.

The federal government may not interfere with the unique prerogatives of
state sovereignty, inter alia, the benefits that a state may provide to its
constitutional officers. In NEW YORK V. UNITED STATES, 326 U.S. 572, 582
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(1946), Justice Frankfurter noted, “Surely the power of Congress to lay
taxes has impliedly no less a reach than the power of Congress to regulate
commerce. There are, of course, State activities and State-owned property
that partake of uniqueness from the point of view of intergovernmental
relations. These inherently constitute a class by themselves. Only a State
can own a Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing. These could
not be included for purposes of federal taxation in any abstract category of
taxpayers without taxing the State as a State.”
70.

Likewise, the State of Missouri’s determination of the compensation and
benefits it will pay to its constitutional officers, judges, and/or other
elected officials is a quintessential state function.

71.

In GREGORY V. ASHCROFT, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the Supreme Court held
that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 did not apply to
Missouri state judges. “Congressional interference with this decision of
the people of Missouri, defining their constitutional officers, would upset
the usual constitutional balance of federal and state powers.” Id. at 460.
“In light of the ADEA’s clear exclusion of most important public officials,
it is at least ambiguous whether Congress intended that appointed judges
nonetheless be included.

In the face of such ambiguity, we will not

attribute to Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions
regardless of whether Congress acted pursuant to its Commerce Clause
powers or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 470.
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72.

In GREGORY, the Supreme Court held the determination of qualifications of
government officials “is an authority that lies at the heart of representative
government,” and thus is a power reserved to the states and the people
under the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 463.

73.

If Congress cannot mandate the qualifications and retirement age for state
court judges, it cannot mandate the nature and extent of health insurance
coverage Missouri must provide its Lieutenant Governor and other
constitutional officers.

B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
74.

The State of Missouri provides Lieutenant Governor Kinder (and its other
elected constitutional officers) health care pursuant to the Missouri
Consolidated Health Care Plan. This health care plan was adopted as part
of a compensation package approved by the Missouri Legislature and
signed into law by the Governor of Missouri. See MO. REV. STAT., sec.
103, et seq.

75.

Under this plan, also offered to Missouri state employees, Missouri pays a
portion of the premium and determines the selection of available coverage.
Missouri provides its state employees—including Lieutenant Governor
Kinder—a variety of health-insurance coverage options and allows the
individual state employees and officers to select an appropriate coverage
option.
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76.

By defining a minimum set of benefits that a state must provide to all its
citizens, PPACA mandates at least part of the compensation package—in
the form of medical benefits—Missouri must provide its elected state
officials.

77.

Section 1513 of PPACA requires the State, as an employer, to provide a
qualified health benefit plan or face a penalty payable to the Department
of the Treasury.

78.

Because of these requirements, PPACA increases the cost to Missouri
taxpayers of providing health-care coverage to Missouri state employees
and elected State officials and limits the options and choices of health-care
coverage available to Lieutenant Governor Kinder and other Missouri
state employees and its elected officials.

79.

Additionally, because health-care coverage is a fundamental component of
the compensation benefits Missouri provides its state employees and
elected state officials, PPACA and its requirement of certain mandated
coverage unconstitutionally invades Missouri’s right as a state and cosovereign to determine the appropriate compensation provided to its
employees and elected officials.

80.

PPACA requires the State of Missouri to provide compensation for elected
state officials and state employees in a manner that overrides the will of
the people of Missouri as expressed by its duly-elected Legislature.
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81.

Because Section 1513 of PPACA interferes with the sovereign right of the
State of Missouri, and in turn Missouri citizens and voters by and through
their elected state officials, to determine the compensation Missouri
provides its elected state officials and state employees, Section 1513 of
PPACA is unconstitutional and must be invalidated.
COUNT THREE

PPACA Is Unconstitutional Because It Imposes An Unconstitutional
Direct Tax and Penalty Upon The State of Missouri
Because Missouri Requires Insurance Companies
To Cover Autism Treatments.
(Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
82.

This Count is also premised upon constitutional principles described
above. Therefore, we do not repeat, but incorporate, those points noted in
Counts One through Two.

83.

Originally, the Supreme Court held the doctrine of “inter-governmental
tax immunity” prohibited states from taxing the income of federal
employees, DOBBINS V. THE COMMISSIONERS

OF

ERIE CTY., 41 U.S. (16

Pet.) 435, 449-50 (1842), and likewise prevented the federal government
from taking the income of state employees, COLLECTOR V. DAY, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.) 113, 128 (1870).
84.

This doctrine of inter-governmental tax immunity was overturned in 1939
in GRAVES. Justice Frankfurter, concurring separately, explained that the
Court no longer held to the principle that a tax imposed upon income was
a tax upon the source from which the income was derived. Thus, a tax
22

upon income an individual received from a state was not a tax upon the
state itself. Id. at 487-92.
85.

Though the Court agreed that states could tax the income of federal
employees (and affirmed the ability of the federal government to tax the
income individuals were paid by States) the Court expressly noted—and
affirmed—that state and federal governments are prohibited from
imposing a direct tax upon each other. Id. at 487.

86.

Thus, the federal government may not impose a direct tax upon the State
of Missouri in contravention of Missouri’s sovereignty.

“A tax is

considered to be directly on the Federal Government only when the levy
falls on the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so
closely connected to the Government that the two cannot realistically be
viewed as separate entities. . . .

The rule with respect to state tax

immunity is essentially the same . . . .” SOUTH CAROLINA V. BAKER, 485
U.S. 505, 523 (1988) (internal quotation omitted).
B.

How PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
87.

The regulation of insurance, including medical and health insurance, is a
matter traditionally and customarily regulated by the states.

88.

Article IV, § 36(b) of the Missouri Constitution created the “Department
of Insurance, Financial Institutions and Professional Registration.”
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89.

Under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 374.010, “The department of insurance, financial
institutions and professional registration shall be charged with the
execution of all laws now in force, or which may be hereafter enacted, in
relation to insurance and insurance companies doing business in this state,
and such other duties as are provided for by law.”

90.

The Missouri legislature has adopted extensive statutes regulating health
insurance in Missouri. See MO. REV. STAT., ch. 376.

91.

The Missouri Senate adopted Senate Bill 167, requiring insurance
providers in Missouri to cover up to $36,000 a year for behavioral therapy
for children younger than eighteen years of age with autism. S.B. 167,
2009 Leg. Sess. (Mo. 2009).

92.

One of the many Missouri families benefiting from Senate Bill 167 is
Mason Keathley and his mother Julie Keathley. Mason Keathley suffers
from autism and will benefit from the behavioral therapy provided for in
health insurance plans regulated under Missouri Law. Julie Keathley is
widowed and a single mother responsible for providing for Mason’s health
care. This benefit, mandated under Missouri state law, will allow Mason
to receive medical care provided by his private insurance coverage that
Julie Keathley would not otherwise be able to provide.

93.

Section 1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) as amended by Section 10104(e)(1) of PPACA,
however, forces States (including Missouri) to make payments to or on
behalf of any individual that is eligible for the premium tax credit to
24

defray costs for benefits managed by that State that are additional to
36B(b)(3)(D) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986.
94.

In other words, because Missouri requires private health insurance
companies to offer more coverage than PPACA’s mandated coverage (in
this coverage for children suffering from autism) the federal government
imposes a direct tax upon the state of Missouri.

95.

Because Missouri (in the course of exercising its traditional state authority
of regulating insurance companies and the terms of health-care insurance
coverage provided Missouri citizens) requires insurance companies in
Missouri to provide coverage of autism and behavioral therapy related to
autism, and such coverage is not required by PPACA, Missouri will be
required to pay a penalty to the federal Treasury in an amount to be
determined by federal actuarial accountants.

96.

This is a direct tax upon the State of Missouri and its citizens, including
Julie Keathley, and as such is unconstitutional. Julie Keathley and her
son, Mason Keathley, have the constitutional right to enjoy the benefits of
Missouri citizenship without those benefits being directly subject to a
penurious tax levied by the federal government.

97.

The payment of a direct tax must be appropriated by the people of the
State of Missouri, or their Legislature in its sovereign role as the State’s
law-making body, consistent with the Missouri Constitution.
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98.

Because PPACA is predicated on the assessment of direct taxes on the
State of Missouri in contravention of both the United States and Missouri
Constitutions,

this

provision

is

unconstitutional

and

Section

1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) as amended by Section 10104(e)(1) must be invalidated.
COUNT FOUR
PPACA Is Unconstitutional Because It Forces Missouri To Violate The
Missouri State Constitution and Enact an Unconstitutional State Tax Increase.
(Federalism, State Sovereignty, and the Tenth Amendment)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
99.

This count is also premised upon the above-stated constitutional
principles. Therefore, we do not repeat, but incorporate, those points
noted in Counts One through Three.

100.

Article IV, § 4 of the United States Constitution states, “The United States
shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government . . . .”

101.

The United States Congress, on March 6, 1820, approved an act entitled
“An Act to Authorize the People of Missouri Territory to Form a
Constitution and State Government, and for the Admission of Such State
into the Union on an Equal Footing with the Original States, and to
Prohibit Slavery in Certain Territories.”

3 Stat. 545 (1820) (“The

Missouri Act of Admission”).
102.

The Missouri Act of Admission provides at Section 7, “And be it further
enacted, That in case a constitution and state government shall be formed
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for the people of the said territory of Missouri, the said convention, or
representatives, as soon thereafter as may be, shall cause a true and
attested copy of such constitution, or frame of state government as shall be
formed or provided, to be transmitted to Congress.” 3 Stat. at 548.
103.

The people of Missouri did adopt such a Constitution and transmitted
Missouri’s proposed state constitution to the Congress. On March 2,
1821, Congress by a joint resolution of the House and Senate accepted
Missouri into the union on the grounds “[t]hat Missouri shall be admitted
into this Union on an equal footing with the original States, in all respects
whatever, upon the fundamental condition, that the fourth clause of the
twenty-sixth section of the third article of the constitution submitted on the
part of said State to Congress, shall never be construed to authorize the
passage of any law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto,
by which any citizen of either of the States of this Union shall be excluded
from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and immunities to which such
citizen is entitled under the constitution of the United States.” 3 Stat. 645
(1821).

104.

Article I, Section 3 of the Missouri Constitution provides: “That the
people of this state have the inherent, sole and exclusive right to regulate
the internal government and police thereof, and to alter and abolish their
constitution and form of government whenever they may deem it
necessary to their safety and happiness, provided such change be not
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repugnant to the Constitution of the United States.” (Original Const. of
1875, art. II, § 2.)
105.

Article I, Section 4 of the Missouri Constitution further provides: “That
Missouri is a free and independent state, subject only to the Constitution
of the United States; that all proposed amendments to the Constitution of
the United States qualifying or affecting the individual liberties of the
people or which in any wise may impair the right of local self-government
belonging to the people of this state, should be submitted to conventions
of the people.” (Original Const. of 1875, art. II, § 3.)

106.

Article X, § 2 of the Missouri Constitution provides that the Missouri
Legislature’s taxing power “shall not be surrendered, suspended or
contracted away, except as authorized by this constitution.”

107.

Article X, § 18 of the Missouri Constitution establishes a tax and
expenditure limit upon the Missouri Legislature known as the “Hancock
Amendment.” Under this Amendment, the Missouri Legislature may not
enact a tax increasing the percentage of Missouri citizens’ income over a
certain percentage of the State’s gross domestic product without first
obtaining a vote of the people.

108.

Like many states, the State of Missouri has a provision directing the
manner and priority for payment of tax revenue from the Missouri
treasury. MO. CONST., art. III, § 36. The funding priorities set forth by
Missourians in their Constitution is that “[a]ll appropriations of money by
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successive general assemblies shall be made in the following order: First:
For payment of sinking fund and interest on outstanding obligations of the
state.

Second: For the purpose of public education.

Third: For the

payment of the cost of assessing and collecting the revenue. Fourth: For
the payment of the civil lists. Fifth: For the support of eleemosynary and
other state institutions.

Sixth: For public health and public welfare.

Seventh: For all other state purposes. Eighth: For the expense of the
general assembly.” (Original Const. of 1875, art. IV, § 43.)
109.

In addition, the State of Missouri—unlike the federal government—is
required to maintain a balanced budget, i.e., it can only spend as much
money as it collects in revenues.

110.

States must remain “independent and autonomous within their proper
sphere of authority.”

PRINTZ, 521 U.S. at 928.

When the federal

government passes laws that require implementation and appropriation by
state legislatures, it oversteps its constitutional bounds, particularly where
such implementation would contravene state constitutional provisions.
111.

The Supreme Court has warned that “[b]y forcing state governments to
absorb the financial burden of implementing a federal regulatory program,
Members of Congress can take credit for ‘solving’ problems without
having to ask their constituents to pay for the solutions with higher federal
taxes. And even when the States are not forced to absorb the costs of
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implementing a federal program, they are still put in the position of taking
the blame for its burdensomeness and for its defects.” Id. at 930.
B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
112.

Under Missouri law enacted prior to Congressional passage of PPACA,
only certain specified low-income individuals and families qualified for
Medicaid (“Medicaid Qualified Persons”). The qualifying income level
set by Missouri was 19% of the federal poverty line for parents, and did
not cover childless adults.

113.

Missouri pays 49% of the cost for medical treatment of Medicaid
Qualified Persons.

114.

Missouri currently appropriates 26% of its annual budget to Medicaid
payments.

This is a total—in fiscal year 2008—of approximately $3

billion.
115.

In opposition to Missouri law as enacted by the duly-elected Missouri
Legislature and signed by its Governor, PPACA mandates that Missouri
enroll in its Medicaid program, inter alia, all childless adults whose
income is less than 133% of the federal poverty line ($14,404 for an
individual and $29,326.50 for a family of four in 2009). The law also
includes a mandatory 5% income disregard bringing the actual eligible
income level to 138% of the federal poverty line ($14,945 for an
individual and $30,429 for a family of four in 2009).
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116.

Importantly, many of these individuals were not uninsured but already
have private insurance coverage or have such coverage available.

117.

Forcing Missouri citizens who currently have private insurance to enroll in
Medicaid has several injurious effects on enrollees, health-care providers,
and Missouri taxpayers. First, this provision greatly increases Missouri
taxpayers’ obligation to pay for these individuals’ medical care, when they
otherwise would have been covered by private insurance.

Second,

because Medicaid reimburses health-care providers (such as local
hospitals and physicians) only about 65% of the cost of this care, whereas
private insurance pays the full cost of medical care, the net result of this
provision is to force these health-care providers to underwrite the cost of
healthcare provided under Medicaid.

And, third, because health-care

providers are reimbursed at a far lower rate, new enrollees from private
plans are generally unable to maintain the same health-care services as
they enjoyed under their private plans.
118.

Based on PPACA’s unfunded mandates, it is estimated that more than
465,000 individuals will be added to Missouri’s Medicaid rolls. Based on
the current average-cost-per-enrollee, the additional coverage population
will impose on the State of Missouri an estimated cost of at least $51
million annually between the fiscal years 2017-19, but balloon to an
additional $1 billion annually beginning in fiscal year 2020 when a federal
subsidy covering part of the cost elapses. The federal government does
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not fund the additional costs that PPACA imposes upon Missouri and its
taxpayers.
119.

The enormous unfunded mandate PPACA imposes on the State of
Missouri interferes with its ability to govern itself in accordance with the
Missouri Constitution. The State of Missouri can only pay the massive
additional cost imposed on it by the federal government if the Missouri
Legislature imposes extraordinary tax increases on the people of the State
of Missouri.

120.

The voters have not authorized Missouri to increase taxes to meet the
demand of this federal mandate and Missouri may not, under the Hancock
Amendment to the Missouri Constitution, raise state taxes without, at
least, the vote of Missouri citizens to approve such an increase.

121.

The Plaintiffs, as citizens of Missouri and Missouri taxpayers, enjoy the
protections afforded them by the Missouri Constitution.

122.

PPACA’s effect is to employ the Missouri Legislature and the people of
the State of Missouri—in their sovereign capacity as citizens of an
individual State and sovereign legislators—to raise state taxes to fund an
illegal and unconstitutional federal health-care scheme.

123.

Because PPACA is predicated on the State of Missouri assessing taxes
unauthorized by voters as required by the Missouri Constitution, Section
2001 of PPACA, as modified by Section 10201 and H.R. 4872, Sections
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1004 and 1201, imposing these additional expenses upon the Plaintiffs,
health-care providers, and the people of Missouri, must be invalidated.
COUNT FIVE
The PPACA Exceeds the Powers Granted Congress Under The
Commerce Clause.
(Commerce Clause)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
124.

We incorporate those points noted in Counts One through Four.

125.

The powers enumerated and granted to the federal government in Article I,
§ 8 do not include any express power or authority of the federal
government to regulate private health insurance.

126.

The Commerce Clause states Congress shall have the authority to,
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States
and with Indian tribes.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

127.

The federal government has exercised all manner of economic regulation
pursuant to the Commerce Clause, but its authority is not without limit.

128.

“The authority of the federal government may not be pushed to such an
extreme as to destroy the distinction, which the commerce clause itself
establishes, between commerce ‘among the several States’ and the internal
concerns of a State. That distinction between what is national and what is
local in the activities of commerce is vital to the maintenance of our
federal system.” N.L.R.B. V. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORP., 301 U.S. 1,
30 (1937).
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129.

The broadest reach of the federal government’s power to act under the
Commerce Clause is found in WICKARD V. FILBURN, 317 U.S. 111 (1942),
holding that the federal government could prohibit a farmer from growing
wheat for household consumption because it would affect other wheat the
farmer grew for sale in interstate commerce.

130.

Even given its broadest reading, WICKARD must still be read in light of the
language of the Constitution and subsequent Supreme Court holdings.
See, e.g., UNITED STATES V. MORRISON, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (holding
Congress lacked authority to adopt civil damages provision in the
Violence Against Women Act); UNITED STATES V. LOPEZ, 514 U.S. 549
(1995) (holding unconstitutional a federal gun law because the activity
was not substantially related to interstate commerce).

131.

One common feature of all cases of the federal government’s exercise of
the Commerce Clause power is that the law adopted pursuant to it may
“regulate” only interstate commerce.

132.

There has never been a case in which, under the Commerce Clause, the
federal government was held to have the power to mandate that a private
citizen enter into commerce. The federal government does not have power
to force a private citizen to enter into a commercial transaction, or
otherwise purchase a good or service.

133.

A holding to the contrary would prove a massive expansion of federal
government power far beyond those enumerated in the Constitution. Such
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a mandate is no different than a federal law ordering citizens to purchase,
for example, a specific General Motors automobile.
B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
134.

Samantha Hill is a Missouri citizen who does not currently have healthcare coverage.

135.

To the extent she is required to acquire health-care coverage, Samantha
Hill desires to obtain only high-deductible “major medical” or
“catastrophic” health insurance coverage.

136.

Samantha Hill seeks this high-deductible health insurance coverage
because these plans are inexpensive, and more expensive health-care plans
provide coverage she will not use and does not need.

137.

Section 1302(e) of the PPACA allows citizens to maintain catastrophic
plans only if an individual is under 30 years of age and certifies that his or
her premium payment is more than eight percent of his or her household
income.

All other individuals will be required to have at least the

minimum essential coverage determined by the Secretary of Health and
Human Services.
138.

PPACA requires Samantha Hill to purchase a health-insurance policy that
includes, inter alia, coverage in the following categories: ambulatory
patient services, maternity and newborn care, mental health and substance
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use disorder services, prescription drugs, laboratory services, and pediatric
services including oral and vision care.
139.

Should Samantha Hill not purchase this mandated health-care coverage,
the PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her, and others similarly
situated. (See Section 1501, as amended by Section 10106.)

140.

The class of “activity” reached by this provision is inactivity, the choice of
Samantha Hill and other like individuals not to purchase a healthinsurance policy required by PPACA. This is a decision not to engage in
economic activity—not a decision to engage in commerce that can be
regulated under Congress’s Commerce Clause power.

141.

As the provisions referenced above provide, Samantha Hill is denied the
option of purchasing high-deductible, major medical, health insurance
policy and is instead compelled to purchase a more expensive health-care
plan she does not need and does not want.

142.

Long before PPACA’s passage, Congress knew the individual mandate to
buy certain federally-sanctioned health insurance was constitutionally
repugnant. A Congressional Research Service report to Congress noted
the lack of constitutional authority for the mandate requirement, finding
that “[d]espite the breadth of powers that have been exercised under the
Commerce Clause, it is unclear whether the clause would provide a solid
constitutional foundation for legislation containing a requirement to have
health insurance. Whether such a requirement would be constitutional
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under the Commerce Clause is perhaps the most challenging question
posed by such a proposal, as it is a novel issue whether Congress may use
this clause to require an individual to purchase a good or service.”
Jennifer Staman & Cynthia Brougher, Cong. Res. Serv., No. R40725,
REQUIRING

INDIVIDUALS

TO

OBTAIN

HEALTH

INSURANCE:

A

CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 3 (July 24, 2009).
143.

Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office wrote that “[a] mandate
requiring all individuals to purchase health insurance would be an
unprecedented form of federal action. The government has never required
people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the
United States. An individual mandate would have two features that, in
combination, would make it unique. First it would impose a duty on
individuals as members of society. Second, it would require people to
purchase a specific service that would be heavily regulated by the federal
government.” Cong. Budget Off., THE BUDGETARY TREATMENT
INDIVIDUAL MANDATE

TO

OF AN

BUY HEALTH INSURANCE 1 (Aug. 1994),

available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf.
144.

The federal mandate requiring Samantha Hill to purchase a specific
health-care policy exceeds the United States Congress’s authority under
the U.S. Constitution, as it is beyond even the broadest reach of the
“commerce clause” power.

Thus, Section 1501 of the PPACA is

unconstitutional as to Samantha Hill and must be invalidated.
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COUNT SIX
The PPACA Imposes an Unconstitutional Direct Tax.
(U.S. Constitution, Article I, §§ 2 and 9)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
145.

We incorporate those points noted in Counts One through Five.

146.

The United States Constitution provides, “Representatives and direct taxes
shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included
within this union, according to their respective numbers . . . .” U.S.
CONST., art. I, § 2, cl. 3.

147.

The United States Constitution also provides, “The Congress shall have
power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the
debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the
United States; but all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States . . . .” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.

148.

The United States Constitution further provides, “No capitation, or other
direct, tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration
herein before directed to be taken.” U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9.

149.

In EISNER V. MACOMBER, 252 U.S. 189, 206 (1920) confirmed that the
constitutional bar against a direct tax remained intact, holding that “[The
Sixteenth Amendment] shall not be extended by loose construction, so as
to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those provisions of the
Constitution that require an apportionment according to population for
direct taxes . . . . This limitation still has an appropriate and important
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function, and is not to be overridden by Congress or disregarded by the
courts.”
B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
150.

Should Samantha Hill not purchase a federally-mandated health insurance
policy, PPACA imposes a financial penalty upon her. See PPACA, sec.
1501.

In an attempt to skirt the limits of its power, Congress

grammatically styled these taxes as “shared responsibility penalties.”
151.

By their very nature, the function and purpose of these “shared
responsibility penalties” is not to raise revenue for the government, but
instead to force individuals to purchase health insurance from private
companies and fund the federal government’s health care regulatory
scheme through coerced payments to private companies offering a product
regulated, defined, controlled, and mandated by the federal government.

152.

The “shared responsibility payment” or “penalty” is nothing but a tax
imposed upon an individual. The taxable event is the person’s failure to
maintain “minimum essential coverage” for any one-month period. As
such, this tax is levied on the person—not on the person’s income. Thus,
it is a capitation tax violating Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution.

153.

The “shared responsibility payment” or “penalty” is not apportioned
among the states as required by Article I, Section 9.

The Sixteenth

Amendment, which authorized Congress to lay an income tax, did not
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otherwise override the apportionment requirement of Article I, Sections 2
and 9. See EISNER, 252 U.S. at 206.
154.

The federal government does not have the power to impose a direct tax
upon a person nor to impose a direct tax that is not apportioned among the
states. Section 1501 of the PPACA violates both these Constitutional
provisions as to Samantha Hill and others, and thus, must be invalidated.
COUNT SEVEN

The Health Care Bill Violates The Constitutional Guarantee
of Equal Protection and the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
(Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Equal Protection Clause)
A.

The Constitutional Principle.
155.

We incorporate the paragraphs of Counts One through Six.

156.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.

157.

The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, “No
person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST., amend. V.

158.

While the Fourteenth Amendment by its terms applies to the States, the
Supreme Court since BOLLING V. SHARPE, 347 U.S. 497, 498-99 (1954) has
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held the federal government to essentially the same standard under the
Fifth Amendment.
159.

The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment commands
that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws,” which is essentially a direction that all persons
similarly situated should be treated alike. PLYLER V. DOE, 457 U.S. 202,
212-13 (1982).

160.

The Supreme Court’s Equal Protection and Fifth Amendment Due Process
analysis have developed three levels of scrutiny—strict, intermediate, and
rational basis—to which a legislative enactment is subject. See, e.g.,
LOVING V. VIRGINIA, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (applying “strict scrutiny” to
invalidate Virginia’s anti-miscengenation statute); CRAIG V. BOREN, 429
U.S. 190 (1976) (applying “intermediate scrutiny” to invalidate a law that
denied women of a certain age the right to purchase alcohol while
allowing men of the same age the ability to buy alcohol); CLEBURNE V.
CLEBURNE LIVING CENTER, INC., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (holding that
mentally-disabled persons were subject to a “rational basis” test and, on
this basis, invalidated zoning laws and land use restrictions that did not
meet standards of rationality).

161.

Under even the lowest level of scrutiny, the “rational basis” standard, “[t]o
withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between
the [designated group] and others must be rationally related to a legitimate
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governmental purpose. . . . The State may not rely on a classification
whose relationship to an asserted goal is so attenuated as to render the
distinction arbitrary or irrational.” Id., 473 U.S. at 446; see also ZOBEL V.
WILLIAMS, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S. DEP’T

OF

AGRIC. V. MORENO,

413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973).
162.

In addition, the Supreme Court has found that the right to travel freely
among the states is a privilege of American citizenship. See SAENZ V. ROE,
526 U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (“The word ‘travel’ is not found in the text of
the Constitution. Yet the ‘constitutional right to travel from one State to
another’ is firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.”) (quoting UNITED
STATES V. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
163.

Dale Morris is a 75-year-old woman living in St. Louis County, Missouri.

164.

Dale Morris desires to purchase Medicare Part “C” (Medicare Advantage)
coverage which provides supplemental coverage for health care and
allows her to receive health care she would not otherwise receive under
Medicare.

165.

Dale Morris suffers from several serious medical conditions including two
heart attacks, colon cancer, and congestive heart failure. As a result of
these medical conditions, she has received quadruple bypass heart surgery
and requires consistent medical care.

42

166.

Because of her medical conditions, Medicare Advantage supplemental
coverage is especially important to Dale Morris so she can receive the
medical care she requires.

167.

Section

3201

of

PPACA

1102) reduces Medicare

Part

(as

amended

C,

dubbed

by

H.R.

“Medicare

4872,

Sec.

Advantage,”

supplemental coverage for most Americans by eliminating the Medicare
Advantage Stabilization Fund. This process begins on January 1, 2011 by
freezing payments at 2010 levels.

Medicare supplemental coverage

reimbursements are then reduced to an unsustainable level beginning in
2012.
168.

This prohibition on Medicare Advantage supplemental coverage applies to
all Missouri citizens, including Dale Morris.

It further applies to all

United States citizens, except individuals living in certain qualifying
Florida counties described in Section 3201(c)(3)(B) of PPACA.
169.

The provision allowing individuals in certain Florida counties to continue
purchasing Medicare Advantage supplemental coverage, but denying
similarly-situated individuals in all other states similar Medicare
Advantage supplemental coverage is a feature of PPACA popularly
referred to as “Gator-Aid.”

170.

The distinction between Dale Morris as a 75-year-old woman living in St.
Louis County, Missouri and any similarly-situated woman or man living
in qualifying counties in Florida is not rationally related to any legitimate
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governmental purpose. Indeed, denying Dale Morris the opportunity to
purchase Medicare supplemental coverage simply based on her zip code is
contrary to PPACA’s purported purpose of increasing citizens’ ability to
obtain health-care coverage, particularly where similarly-situated United
States citizens are able to continue to maintain their current coverage.
171.

Because the PPACA fails to provide a rational basis for discriminating
among similarly-situated Americans, the provision of the statute must be
invalidated.

172.

The provision popularly known as “Gator-Aid” is also contrary to
PPACA’s purported purpose of increasing citizens’ ability to maintain
their current health-care coverage.

President Obama, for example,

promised that after PPACA’s enactment, “if you like your health care
plan, you keep your health care plan. Nobody is going to force you to
leave your health care plan.”2
173.

But Dale Morris, her fellow Missouri citizens, and others who wish to
“keep” their current health care plan, as President Obama promised them,
are now required by federal law to uproot from their homes and move to
one of the privileged counties specified by PPACA where Medicare
Advantage will be maintained.

Conversely, holders of Medicare

Advantage living in those counties cannot leave those counties without

2

President Obama, Remarks by the President in Town Hall on Health Care, Central High
School, Grand Junction, Colorado (Aug. 15, 2009).
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losing their health-care plan. The burden on free passage introduced by
these passages of the PPACA is inimical not only to basic protections of
equal protection, but further to the freedom of movement that all
American citizens are entitled to under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.
174.

Because Section 3201 of the PPACA violates Dale Morris’s right to equal
protection under the laws, as well as the Privileges and Immunities clause
of the Constitution, that provision of the statute must be invalidated.
COUNT EIGHT

The Health Care Bill Violates The Due Process Clause And Free Speech Rights.
(Fourteenth Amendment, Due Process Clause; First Amendment)
A.

The Constitutional Principles.
175.

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides,
“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”
U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.

176.

“It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of personal liberty
which the government may not enter.”

PLANNED PARENTHOOD

OF

SOUTHEASTERN PA. V. CASEY, 505 U.S. 833, 847 (1992). “These matters,
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty
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is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under
compulsion of the State.” Id. at 851.
177.

The realm of personal liberty protected by the United States Constitution
as defined by the Supreme Court includes the right to make personal
health-care decisions on behalf of one’s self, and if applicable, one’s
family.

Indeed, these are two general rights guaranteed by the

Constitution but abridged by PPACA: the right to make family decisions
and the right to physical autonomy. Id. at 884. In both these cases, the
federal government has usurped these rights and injected federal officials
into the decisions of Missouri citizens concerning their health care.
178.

Flowing from these rights is the central principle that “a competent person
has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment.” CRUZAN V. DIRECTOR, MO. DEP’T

OF

HEALTH, 497

U.S. 261, 278 (1990). This liberty interest is inviolable.
179.

Not only is this liberty interest inviolable, but the Supreme Court has held
that the doctor-patient relationship must be held similarly free of
interference by and from the federal government. CASEY, 505 U.S. at 844.

180.

The Supreme Court has long held that inherent in the First Amendment is
not only the right to free speech, but the right to resist speech compelled
by the Government, unless such speech is reasonably compelled to enforce
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statutes or regulations adopted under some other properly-exercised
federal power. WEST VIRGINIA STATE BD. OF EDUC. V. BARNETTE, 319 U.S.
624, 630 (1943). Thus, Americans regularly file 1040 forms and are
required to register with the Selective Service. Even valid regulations that
unreasonably compel speech are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.
SIMON & SCHUSTER, INC. V. MEMBERS OF NEW YORK STATE CRIME VICTIMS’
BD., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) (“We have long recognized that even
regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the
exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment.”).
B.

How The PPACA Violates These Constitutional Principles.
181.

Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s holdings as to the individual nature
of the doctor-patient relationship, the PPACA establishes certain “panels”
that purport to determine levels of appropriate treatment for various health
care situations. (See PPACA, sec. 4003.)

182.

These federal panels interfere with the doctor-patient relationship, in that
they direct and require treatment—or non-treatment—in a mandated
manner without regard for the patient or the patient’s doctor.

183.

Doctors and patients are not allowed to make decisions free from
intervention, but are instead compelled to discuss and resolve questions of
medical care only within the bounds that the federal panels have
established.
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184.

Moreover, as part of PPACA’s enforcement scheme, individuals are
required to certify that they have acquired a qualifying health insurance
policy mandated by the federal government.

185.

Thus, decisions that were once made solely in the confines of a doctorpatient relationship are now delegated to unelected government “panels,”
violating the autonomy of the doctor-patient relationship and the
individual liberty interests of Dale Morris, the Plaintiffs, and other
Missourians to make personal medical decisions.

186.

These provisions are particularly harmful to individuals such as Dale
Morris, who are ill and seek to exercise their freedom to obtain medical
advice and care from their physician free from officious government
interference.

187.

An individual’s decision to seek medical care and the nature and scope of
the medical care of that care are constitutionally protected liberty interests.
Flowing from this liberty interest is the constitutionally-protected
relationship between a patient and doctor to make appropriate medical
decisions.

188.

Under PPACA, this liberty interest has been violated. Now, even when a
patient and their physician determine the best medical treatment for the
patient, and even if the patient is willing to pay for the cost of the
treatment herself, she is not allowed to receive the medical treatment her
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physician deems appropriate unless it is also agreed to by the government
panel established under PPACA.
189.

The unelected panel of federal officials determining what medical care
Dale Morris and other Missourians may or may not receive (even when
they are willing to pay for the care themselves) is not based upon
legitimate the patient’s health or safety concerns but upon economic
considerations. In other words, this provision of PPACA, through which
an unelected panel of federal officials determines what medical care Dale
Morris and other Missourians may receive, is a rationing panel.

190.

Because it violates constitutionally-protected liberty interests belonging to
Dale Morris and the other Missouri plaintiffs, without due process of law,
Section 4003 of PPACA must be invalidated to the extent unelected
federal panels are allowed to interfere with the constitutionally-protected
relationship between individual and doctor and ration medicallyappropriate care.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs request that:
1.

The Court declare the aforementioned sections of the PPACA

unconstitutional as they apply to Plaintiffs;
2.

The Court enter an order enjoining the Defendants from enforcing

the aforementioned sections of PPACA against Plaintiffs; and
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3.

The Court award Plaintiffs costs incurred herein, and for such

other relief as the Court shall deem just and proper.

Dated: July 7, 2010
ARENT FOX, LLP

_______________________________
MARK F. (THOR) HEARNE, II
LINDSAY S. C. BRINTON
1050 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 828-3447
Thor@ArentFox.com
ROBERT C. O’BRIEN
STEVEN A. HASKINS
555 West Fifth Street, 48th Floor
Los Angeles, CA, 90013
(213) 629-7400
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